Friday, January 08, 2016

Article Spotlight: Philip Morris and the Use of Third Parties to Oppose Ingredient Disclosure Regulations

Every few months, we highlight a newly published article/post/report along with a few key industry documents used in the paper as a primary source:

Velicer C, Glantz SA (2015) Hiding in the Shadows: Philip Morris and the Use of Third Parties to Oppose Ingredient Disclosure Regulations. PLoS ONE 10(12): e0142032. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142032

In 1996 Massachusetts proposed regulations that would require tobacco companies to disclose information about the ingredients in their products. This December 2015 paper examines the strategies employed by Philip Morris to stop these regulations from being implemented. The authors used tobacco documents to demonstrate the tobacco companies' historical use of third parties to form coalitions to oppose ingredient disclosure regulations and how these coalitions have prevented regulations by creating the appearance of local opposition to the measures.

Key Documents from the UCSF Truth Tobacco Industry Documents:

• Chayet N (1996) Ingredient Disclosure. 12 Nov 1996. Available: https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/tnxp0076
  Document from a communications firm contracted by Philip Morris that warns "food police" could use a similar approach to food "containing caffeine, fat, or whatever else zealous consumer organizations believe is harmful."
  
  
• Salinsky R (1997) M.G.L. Chapter 94, Section 307a, Proposed Implementation Regulations. 20 Feb 1997. Available: https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/yylp0054
  Richard Salinsky, then president of the Best Petroleum Company based in Massachusetts and member of the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America (SIGMA), argued in a public comment to the Dept of Public Health, that the proposed regulations did not protect consumers because it could create the illusion of safer cigarettes. Stalinsky said, "rather than having an effect of reducing risks to public health, [the regulations] have the opposite effect of increasing such risks by creating a false illusion that some brands of cigarettes are ‘more healthy’ than others."
  
  
• Vermont Ingredients Disclosure Plan. 16 Aug 1996. Available: https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/qjyh0045
  Philip Morris political strategy for fighting ingredient disclosure in Vermont that mirrored its Massachusetts activities in 1996 and 1997 and provides a more detailed description of its two-phase approach to defeat the bill: (1) building third party alliances (the “educational outreach”), and (2) legislative phase.
  
  
• Project Breakthrough. 1994. Available: https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/pyhc0003
  RJ Reynolds launched "Project Breakthrough" a campaign to convince Americans that anti-smoking advocates wanted cigarettes to be completely prohibited. The campaign was aimed at spreading the fear that other products could be made illegal including alcohol, beef, pork, private property, logging, fur, cholesterol and motorcycles.